Publications

The difficulty of forming a Federation government is not an emergency. This crisis has nothing whatsoever to do with “peace implementation”. Thus, nothing in this situation justifies foreign intervention. In fact, it is plainly obvious what OHR should do: nothing at all, except to announce that it will not get involved.

Each year the European Commission assesses 33 policy areas – laws, institutions, policy implementation – into which the accession negotiations are divided. It does so for 10 countries which aspire to join the EU. Since 2015, it has established a lot of credibility through its tough objective assessments. Getting to a state of good preparation in each chapter is not about boxes being ticked but about meeting the standards on which the trust relies that makes removing all barriers between countries and economies possible.

Avrupa Birliği'ne aday on ülkenin katılım müzakerelerindeki durumu, Avrupa Komisyonu tarafından, her yıl, ayrı ayrı değerlendirmeye tâbi tutuluyor. Komisyon, 2015'ten bu yana, 33 siyaset faslında kanun, kurum ve uygulamalara ilişkin gelişmeleri katı kurallara sadık kalarak irdelediği bu nesnel çalışmalar sayesinde büyük bir güvenilirlik kazanmış bulunuyor. Ancak her fasılda "iyi hazırlık" seviyelerine çıkmak, kutucuk işaretlenmesiyle gerçekleşmiyor. Söz konusu seviyelere varmak, hem ülkeler hem ekonomiler arasındaki tüm duvarların kaldırılmasını mümkün kılacak şekilde AB standartlarının karşılandığına duyulan güvenle ilişkili.

Following Russia’s brutal invasion in February 2022, millions of Ukrainian refugees left their country. By the end of December 2022, 4.9 million of them had applied for protection in the European Union and in other European democracies. But more Ukrainians applied for protection in the Czech Republic (11 million inhabitants) than in France, Italy and Spain combined (174 million inhabitants). What explains this uneven distribution of temporary protection applications?

Nach dem brutalen Einmarsch Russlands im Februar 2022 verließen Millionen von ukrainischen Flüchtlingen ihr Land. Bis Ende Dezember 2022 hatten 4,9 Millionen Schutz in der Europäischen Union und in anderen europäischen Demokratien beantragt. In der Tschechischen Republik (11 Millionen Einwohner) beantragten jedoch mehr Ukrainer Schutz als in Frankreich, Italien und Spanien zusammen (174 Millionen Einwohner). Wie erklärt sich diese ungleiche Verteilung der Anträge auf vorübergehenden Schutz?

A la suite de l'invasion brutale de leur pays par la Russie en février 2022, des millions de réfugiés ukrainiens ont quitté leurs terres. Fin décembre 2022, 4,9 millions d'entre eux avaient déjà demandé la protection temporaire dans l'Union européenne ou dans d'autres démocraties européennes. Mais, plus d'Ukrainiens ont demandé la protection en Tchéquie (11 millions d'habitants) qu'en France, en Italie et en Espagne, tous les trois pays réunis (174 millions d'habitants). Comment expliquer cette répartition inégale des demandes de protection temporaire ?

Zeno, an Athenian philosopher, once imagined a race between Achilles and a slow-moving turtle. The turtle was given a head start, which decided the race. However slowly the turtle moved, Zeno argued, Achilles would never be able to catch up. This is how the current EU accession process for the Western Balkans works. This is dangerous. It is also easy to remedy, if there is the will.

Aujourd’hui, la Commission européenne, l’exécutif de l’UE, doit prendre une décision capitale. Elle doit se tourner vers la Cour européenne de justice (CEJ) et requérir une amende sans précédent contre un gouvernement qui refuse d’appliquer l’un des arrêts les plus importants de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne, rendu par la CEJ. En mettant ainsi Ziobro au pied du mur, la Commission européenne et la CEJ parviendraient non seulement à sauver l’Etat de droit en Pologne et préserver l’ordre juridique de l’UE, mais aussi, à rompre le charme, en détruisant cette fascination qu’éprouve une minorité radicale de plus en plus réduite, pour le ministre polonais.

Today the European Commission faces a momentous decision on Poland. It must turn to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and ask for an unprecedented penalty payment from a government which is refusing to implement one of the most important ECJ judgements in the history of European integration. By calling minister of justice Zbigniew Ziobro’s bluff the European Commission and the ECJ not only save the rule of law in Poland and preserve the EU’s legal order but also break his spell over a shrinking radical minority.

When member states violate EU law or refuse to implement judgements by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) EU institutions are not powerless: the European Commission can propose, and the ECJ impose, financial sanctions.

No member state in the history of the EU has ever gone as far in subjugating its courts to executive control as the current Polish government. In a few years, PiS has changed the whole system of appointment, promotion and disciplining of judges and prosecutors, with a view to strengthening executive control. It captured the Constitutional Tribunal.

What should happen next? What does it mean to say that “all options are on the table” to ensure that Navalny is released and that judgements are implemented? Or that “there are possibilities” of action for the body responsible for the execution of all Strasbourg Court judgements, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, currently chaired by Germany?

The EU faces three major crises today. One is a public health crisis, which threatens hundreds of thousands of lives. One is an unprecedented economic and social crisis, which puts at risk the employment and livelihoods of tens of millions of Europeans. And then there is a crisis of core values that underpin the European project: the rule of law and the checks and balances of liberal democracy. These are under attack today from inside and outside the Union.

30 March 2020 was a dark day in the history of EU assistance. It highlighted the fact that this system of solidarity had gone fundamentally wrong. Europeans now need to find better ways to defend the values enshrined in their treaties, not with pious words and empty threats, but in the language of power and money that politicians like Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban will understand.

Priorities this winter: end the humanitarian emergency on the islands; avoid a new humanitarian emergency on the mainland; reduce the number of people crossing the Balkan route; ensure that there are no push backs at any border in South East Europe.

Balkan enlargement was in crisis even before EU leaders failed to agree in 2019 on opening accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania. Unless there is a change in methodology and pace, no Western Balkan country is likely to be a member of the EU by 2030. 

Priorities this winter: end the humanitarian emergency on the islands; avoid a new humanitarian emergency on the mainland; reduce the number of people crossing the Balkan route; ensure that there are no push backs at any border in South East Europe.

No member state in the history of the EU has ever gone as far in subjugating its courts to executive control as the current Polish government. The Polish case has become a test whether it is possible to create a Soviet-style justice system in an EU member state; a system where the control of courts, prosecutors and judges lies with the executive and a single party.