Publications

For Turkey to reintroduce the death penalty – the last execution took place in 1984 – would constitute a serious setback in the global struggle against capital punishment. Europeans should take the threat of the return of capital punishment in Turkey seriously. The EU and the Council of Europe should take every step they can, in time, to make this as unlikely as possible – in Turkey and anywhere else in Europe.

Both Turkey and the EU need to find a framework where sensitive issues can be discussed fruitfully. A reformed accession process provides such a framework. The key to such a process is clarity: it needs to be clear what EU standards are, how far Turkey is from meeting them and why it is useful for both sides to remain engaged in a dialogue on this. The EU needs a policy that is understood before it can have one that might be transformative.

The EU-Turkey refugee agreement reached on 18 March 2016 has had a dramatic impact on refugee movements in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has sharply reduced irregular crossings from Turkey to Greece and, with this, the number of people who drown on this dangerous journey. If the EU-Turkey agreement is implemented in full, it will demonstrate that it is possible to control borders and at the same time respect the UN Refugee Convention, combining compassion and empathy with control and security concerns.

Temel uluslararası normları yolsuzluk vasıtasıyla işlevsiz kılmak mümkün mü? Uluslararası siyaset siyasetçilerin şahsî hırslarına göre baştan aşağı yeniden şekillendirilebilir mi? Bu iki soru günümüzde küresel çapta siyasetin yanıt bulmaya çalıştığı en önemli sorular arasında. Ancak "evet" cevabı veren bir kurum özellikle dikkat çekiyor: Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi'nin koruyucusu ve –kurulduğu 1949 yılından bu yana- dünyanın en önde gelen hükûmetlerarası insan hakları kuruluşu olan Avrupa Konseyi.

¿Puede la corrupción socavar normas básicas internacionales? ¿Puede la avaricia personal de los políticos remodelar la base de la política internacional? Éstas son las preguntas más importantes sobre la política mundial actual. Para el Consejo de Europa, protector de la Convención Europea de Derechos Humanos y, desde su creación en 1949, la institución intergubernamental de derechos humanos más destacada en el mundo, la respuesta es "sí".

Kann Korruption grundlegende internationale Normen untergraben? Kann die Habgier von Politikern internationale Politik fundamental umgestalten? Dies sind heute zwei der wichtigsten weltpolitischen Fragen. Für den Europarat, den Hüter der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und seit seiner Gründung 1949 die weltweit führende zwischenstaatliche Menschenrechtsinstitution, lautet die Antwort auf beide Fragen ja.

Can basic international norms be undermined by corruption? Can international politics be fundamentally reshaped by the personal greed of politicians? These are among the most important questions in global politics today. When it comes to the Council of Europe, guardian of the European Convention of Human Rights and, since its creation in 1949, the leading intergovernmental human rights institution in the world, the answer to both questions is yes.

So what is to be done? ESI has made three concrete proposals in recent months. The EU should create conditions that allow sending a strong asylum support mission to Greece with at least 200 case workers. The EU, in cooperation with UNHCR, should create a mechanism of verification for everyone returned to Turkey; spell out precisely and publicly what Turkey would need to do to be a safe third country for all non-Syrians to be returned from Greece; and make this the key condition for visa liberalisation before the end of the year. The EU should appoint a senior special representative for the implementation of the EU Turkey agreement – a former prime minister or foreign minister, with the experience and authority to address urgent implementation issues on the ground and to communicate clearly with different audiences, from the citizens on Greek islands to the Turkish public, from human rights organisations and the media to prime ministers across the EU.

Eylül raporu daha derin bir incelemeye tâbi tutulduğunda AB-Türkiye Anlaşması’nın ne kadar kırılganlaştığını, belirginleşmiş sorunları aşarak anlaşmanın doğru uygulanmasını sağlamak adına ne kadar az kafa yorulduğunu görmek mümkün. Ezcümle, uygulama ve iletişim noktalarında şu ana kadar yapılanlar son derece yetersiz.

This paper has one simple purpose: it is an appeal to European institutions to improve their reporting on what is actually happening on Lesbos, Chios, and other Greek islands. The information that is needed to assess the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement is straightforward and should be presented in a weekly update. The fact that this does not exist yet is troubling. It raises the possibility that European institutions do not have this information. It also suggests that the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement is not proceeding as foreseen, and that the EU support mission to Greece resembles a vessel sailing in the dark, without instruments, without a captain, which might hit a rock at any moment.

Bu çalışmamızın tek amacı, Midilli, Sakız ve diğer Yunan adalarında hâlihazırda neler yaşandığına dair yapılan raporlamaların daha kapsamlı olması yönünde AB kurumlarına çağrıda bulunmak. AB-Türkiye Anlaşması'nın uygulanmasına dair değerlendirme yapmak için hangi verilere ihtiyaç duyulduğu apaçık biliniyor. Bu verilerin haftalık güncellemeler ile sunulması gerekiyor. Söz konusu bilgilendirmelerin hâlâ yapılmaması AB kurumlarının durumdan yeteri kadar haberdâr olmadığını düşündürüyor. Neticede hem anlaşmanın umulduğu gibi uygulanamadığı ihtimâli gündeme geliyor hem de AB'nin Yunanistan'a destek misyonu, karanlıkta yol alan, teçhizatsız ve kaptansız, her an bir kayaya çarpma ihtimâli bulunan bir gemi gibi algılanıyor.

One popular idea about Bosnia and Herzegovina among European observers is that Newton's first law of motion applies to its politics: this law says that an object at rest will stay at rest unless acted upon by an outside force. For Bosnian politics, that outside force has to be the international community.

Među europskim promatračima Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH) popularna je ideja o primjeni prvog Newtonovog zakona kretanja na bh. politiku. Ovaj zakon kaže će tijelo ostati u stanju mirovanja sve dok neka vanjska sila ne dovede do promjene tog stanja. Za bh. politiku ta vanjska sila mora biti međunarodna zajednica.

Niemand weiß genau wie viele tausend Menschen den Norden Montenegros in der ersten Jahreshälfte 2015 verlassen haben. Als NGOs vor Ort Anfang des Jahres Alarm schlugen, versuchten einige, die Familien zu zählen, die mit größerem Gepäck Busse nach Deutschland bestiegen. Die Regierung in Podgorica stritt vorerst ab, dass irgendetwas Ungewöhnliches vor sich ginge. In den Cafés in Montenegros Norden begann man, über den Exodus zu spekulieren. Einige erinnerten sich, wie die Osmanen in der Vergangenheit junge Knaben entführt hatten: war Deutschland daran interessiert, montenegrinische Kinder als moderne Janitscharen anzulocken? Andere vermuteten eine Verschwörung mit dem Ziel, das ethnische Gleichgewicht zu verändern, da die meisten Abwandernden Bosniaken (muslimische Slaven) waren.

Nobody knows exactly how many thousands of people left northern Montenegro in the first half of 2015. When local civic organisations first sounded the alarm early in the year, some tried to count families with luggage getting onto buses to Germany. The national government in Podgorica first denied that anything remarkable was going on. In cafés in Montenegro’s North people began to speculate about the exodus. Some ominously recalled how the Ottomans took away healthy boys in the past: was Germany interested in attracting Montenegrin children as modern-day Janissaries? Others suspected a plot to change the ethnic balance, since most of the people who left were Bosniaks (Muslim Slavs).

Önümüzdeki gün ve haftalarda geliştirilip düzeltilmediği takdirde, bu metin başarısızlığa mahkûm. AB’ye Türkiye’den gelen mülteci sayısı azalmayacak İki taraf da birbirini suçlamaya başlayacak. Hayâl kırıklığı ve gerginlik zaten var olan karşılıklı güven bunalımını körükleyecek. Çok mühim bir zaman dilimi de böylece boşa harcanacak.

If current trends continue, the number of people who reach Germany from Turkey (via Greece) will not go down significantly in the first months of 2016. To change this, the EU expects Turkey to do three things which are all costly, difficult and unpopular.
 

Unless this deal is substantially improved in the coming days and weeks, it simply sets the stage for failure. The influx of refugees coming into the EU from Turkey will not abate. Both sides will then blame each other. Frustration will erode already dangerously low levels of trust. Precious time will have been wasted.

“Güvenli üçüncü ülke” başka ülke uyruklu sığınmacılar için güvenli olan ülke demek. ESI’nin teklifi Suriye, Irak, Afganistan ve diğer bazı ülkelerden gelen sığınmacılar açısından Türkiye’nin güvenli ülke olarak addedilmesi temeline oturuyor. Böylece Yunanistan bu ülkelerin vatandaşlarını hak ve güvenliklerini tehlikeye atmadan Türkiye’ye geri gönderebilecek. Akabinde, Ege’yi geçen bot sayısında hızlı bir düşüş yaşanacak çünkü Yunanistan’a ulaşanlar Türkiye tarafından geri alınacağı için bu tehlikeli yolculuk anlamını yitirmiş olacak.

A “safe third country” describes a country that it safe for asylum seekers of nationalities other than that of this country. The ESI proposal is based on the assumption that Turkey is a safe third country for asylum-seekers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries, so that Greece could return them to Turkey without jeopardising their rights and safety. This would quickly reduce the number of boats crossing the Aegean as the dangerous passage would become pointless – everybody reaching Greece would be returned back to Turkey.