Publications

One popular idea about Bosnia and Herzegovina among European observers is that Newton's first law of motion applies to its politics: this law says that an object at rest will stay at rest unless acted upon by an outside force. For Bosnian politics, that outside force has to be the international community.

Među europskim promatračima Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH) popularna je ideja o primjeni prvog Newtonovog zakona kretanja na bh. politiku. Ovaj zakon kaže će tijelo ostati u stanju mirovanja sve dok neka vanjska sila ne dovede do promjene tog stanja. Za bh. politiku ta vanjska sila mora biti međunarodna zajednica.

Nobody knows exactly how many thousands of people left northern Montenegro in the first half of 2015. When local civic organisations first sounded the alarm early in the year, some tried to count families with luggage getting onto buses to Germany. The national government in Podgorica first denied that anything remarkable was going on. In cafés in Montenegro’s North people began to speculate about the exodus. Some ominously recalled how the Ottomans took away healthy boys in the past: was Germany interested in attracting Montenegrin children as modern-day Janissaries? Others suspected a plot to change the ethnic balance, since most of the people who left were Bosniaks (Muslim Slavs).

Niemand weiß genau wie viele tausend Menschen den Norden Montenegros in der ersten Jahreshälfte 2015 verlassen haben. Als NGOs vor Ort Anfang des Jahres Alarm schlugen, versuchten einige, die Familien zu zählen, die mit größerem Gepäck Busse nach Deutschland bestiegen. Die Regierung in Podgorica stritt vorerst ab, dass irgendetwas Ungewöhnliches vor sich ginge. In den Cafés in Montenegros Norden begann man, über den Exodus zu spekulieren. Einige erinnerten sich, wie die Osmanen in der Vergangenheit junge Knaben entführt hatten: war Deutschland daran interessiert, montenegrinische Kinder als moderne Janitscharen anzulocken? Andere vermuteten eine Verschwörung mit dem Ziel, das ethnische Gleichgewicht zu verändern, da die meisten Abwandernden Bosniaken (muslimische Slaven) waren.

Önümüzdeki gün ve haftalarda geliştirilip düzeltilmediği takdirde, bu metin başarısızlığa mahkûm. AB’ye Türkiye’den gelen mülteci sayısı azalmayacak İki taraf da birbirini suçlamaya başlayacak. Hayâl kırıklığı ve gerginlik zaten var olan karşılıklı güven bunalımını körükleyecek. Çok mühim bir zaman dilimi de böylece boşa harcanacak.

If current trends continue, the number of people who reach Germany from Turkey (via Greece) will not go down significantly in the first months of 2016. To change this, the EU expects Turkey to do three things which are all costly, difficult and unpopular.
 

Unless this deal is substantially improved in the coming days and weeks, it simply sets the stage for failure. The influx of refugees coming into the EU from Turkey will not abate. Both sides will then blame each other. Frustration will erode already dangerously low levels of trust. Precious time will have been wasted.

“Güvenli üçüncü ülke” başka ülke uyruklu sığınmacılar için güvenli olan ülke demek. ESI’nin teklifi Suriye, Irak, Afganistan ve diğer bazı ülkelerden gelen sığınmacılar açısından Türkiye’nin güvenli ülke olarak addedilmesi temeline oturuyor. Böylece Yunanistan bu ülkelerin vatandaşlarını hak ve güvenliklerini tehlikeye atmadan Türkiye’ye geri gönderebilecek. Akabinde, Ege’yi geçen bot sayısında hızlı bir düşüş yaşanacak çünkü Yunanistan’a ulaşanlar Türkiye tarafından geri alınacağı için bu tehlikeli yolculuk anlamını yitirmiş olacak.

A “safe third country” describes a country that it safe for asylum seekers of nationalities other than that of this country. The ESI proposal is based on the assumption that Turkey is a safe third country for asylum-seekers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries, so that Greece could return them to Turkey without jeopardising their rights and safety. This would quickly reduce the number of boats crossing the Aegean as the dangerous passage would become pointless – everybody reaching Greece would be returned back to Turkey.

The Greek-Turkish borders have been for years one of the main gateways to the EU for asylum seekers and other migrants who intend to reach the EU by illegally crossing borders. Between 2010 and mid-2012, the land route was the preferred way. In 2013, the total number of detections of illegal border crossings fell to 12,600 at all Greek-Turkish borders following a series of measures at the land border and in Greece. However, pressure started rising at the Greek-Turkish sea border to reach record numbers in 2014. 

Questo documento illustra come un accordo tra Germania e Turchia potrebbe avere un impatto immediato e drammatico sulla crisi dei rifugiati siriani. Restituirebbe il controllo del confine sud-orientale dell'Europa senza sacrificare la compassione per i rifugiati. Ma con il riemergere dell'estrema destra in tutta Europa, la finestra di opportunità per un'azione decisiva si sta chiudendo velocemente.

This paper outlines how an agreement between Germany and Turkey could have an immediate and dramatic impact on the Syrian refugee crisis. It would restore control over Europe’s south-eastern border without sacrificing compassion for the refugees. But with the far right resurgent across Europe, the window of opportunity for decisive action is closing fast.

Elinizdeki çalışma, Almanya ve Türkiye arasında varılacak bir anlaşmanın, yaşanmakta olan Suriye kaynaklı mülteci krizinin çözümü açısından ne kadar çabuk ve önemli etkileri olacağını ortaya koyuyor. Böyle bir anlaşma, hem Avrupa'nın güneydoğu sınırlarında kontrolün yeniden sağlanmasını hem de mültecilere karşı merhametli bir yaklaşım gösterilebilmesini mümkün kılabilir. Ancak Avrupa genelinde aşırı sağın dirilişi nedeni ile, bu tür bir çözüme yönelik kararlı adımlar atma olasılığı hızla uzaklaşıyor.

It is essential that these 500,000 asylum seekers are accepted from Turkey, before they take to boats to cross the Aegean. As a quid pro quo, it is also essential that Turkey agrees to take back all the refugees that reach Greece, from the moment the deal is signed. It is the combination of these measures that will cut the ground from under the feet of the people smugglers. If Syrian refugees have a safe and realistic option for claiming asylum in the EU in Turkey, and if they face certain return back to Turkey if they cross illegally, the incentive to risk their lives on the Aegean will disappear.

Nationalists around the world see the role of history in terms of awaking emotions of loyalty. They are particularly concerned that the young are taught to love their nation and to know its enemies. The point of teaching wartime history in school is to instil patriotism, and to convey that in a dangerous world the survival of any nation depends on its ability to win its battles. Nationalists do not accept the view that in a democracy a historian’s role is to challenge cherished myths; and that in an open society history education should prepare students for citizenship in a world where all institutions are imperfect – a world where, unnervingly, even those we admire may be responsible for crimes.

Nacionalisti diljem svijeta vide ulogu povijesti u pogledu buđenja osjećaja lojalnosti. Osobito im je važno da se mlade ljude uči da vole svoju naciju i znaju prepoznati neprijatelja. Svrha učenja ratne povijesti u školama je usaditi patriotizam i prenijeti poruku da u opasnom svijetu opstanak bilo koje nacije ovisi o njenoj sposobnosti da dobije bitke. Nacionalisti ne prihvaćaju stav da je u demokraciji uloga povjesničara da preispituje sačuvane mitove; te da u otvorenom društvu obrazovanje treba pripremiti studente za državljanstvo u svijetu gdje su sve institucije nesavršene – svijet u kome, koliko god neugodno bilo, čak i oni kojima se divimo mogu biti odgovorni za zlodjela.

There is an obvious conceptual problem with the way countries are ranked in the Doing Business project. To better understand this central problem, imagine two very different economies from two hypothetical countries seeking to climb their way up in the World Bank’s rankings. The first country – let us call it Balkania – consists mainly of cafés, small shops, wedding parlours and subsistence farmers. The other – Danubia – is an industrial economy that produces high-value goods for export, with chemical plants, agro-processing, pharmaceuticals and industrial agriculture.

The Statistical Roadmap for accession countries consists of three parts, based on the three categories used for many years in the progress reports for chapter 18: Block I: Statistical infrastructure; Block II: Classifications and registers; Block III: Sectoral Statistics. Every year Eurostat looks at compliance with EU standards concerning individual statistical benchmarks.

Në vitin 2005 dhe 2006, ESI bëri një studim mbi varfërinë rurale, migrimin dhe remitancat në Kosovë dhe botuam raportin e titulluar "Cutting the Lifeline." Raporti tregon që migrimi – veçanarisht i djemve të rinj – ka qenë i domosdoshëm për mbijetesën ekonomike të gjeneratave të tëra. Raporti nënvizon se mbyllja e dyerve evropiane për migrim të rregullt të punës pas vitit 1999, la bashkimin familjar si të vetmën rrugë ligjore për migrim.

In 2005 ESI undertook research on rural poverty, migration and remittances in Kosovo. Our conclusions were published in 2006 in a report called “Cutting the Lifeline” that showed how migration had been a necessity for many generations of young men in particular. The report also examined how after 1999, the European doors to legal work migration closed, and only the lucky few with close family in the diaspora could migrate through family reunification schemes. In the report, we described in detail the economic realities of two villages that are representative of the wider social and economic situation in Kosovo: Cerrce, located in north-west Kosovo on the border with Albania, and Lubishte, situated in the mountainous southeast. Our findings clearly showed that economic development, without significant numbers of people leaving such villages to find work, skills and capital elsewhere, is simply inconceivable.