Why Croatia’s EU accession will strengthen the EU (in English)

Why Croatia’s EU accession will strengthen the EU

Gerald Knaus and Kristof Bender

First there was the headline in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 9 October: “Brussels reprimands Croatia: ‘Criteria for accession are not yet met’.” Then Gunther Krichbaum (CDU), Chair of the Europe Committee in the German Bundestag, declared: “At this moment the country is not ready to join.” President of the Bundestag Norbert Lammert explained: “We have… to take the most recent progress report of the European Commission seriously: Croatia apparently is not yet ready to join.” On 15 October, Martin Winter wrote in Süddeutschen Zeitung that Croatia is indeed “not mature enough”, but that it is now too late: “It is a pity: Lammert’s objection comes a bit late.”

These are disturbing warnings. Is the EU about to be weakened through the hasty accession of yet another unprepared member? Doesn’t the EU have problems enough already?

In fact, Croatia’s preparations for accession have been widely recognised as remarkable. Since its application for membership in 2003, Croatia has faced demands that were considerably more challenging than those presented to previous candidates. It not only had to pass EU-compliant legislation, but also demonstrate real progress in implementing what were often challenging reforms. These efforts were recognised by the European Parliament in December, with a vote of 564 to 38 in favour of Croatia’s accession, and by the 16 EU member states that have already ratified the accession treaty. Last week’s European Commission scorecard confirms that Croatia is now completing the process of alignment. It’s ‘top ten’ list of outstanding issues – such as the privatisation of three shipyards, a new law on access to information, a national migration strategy and a new recruitments to the border police – are by no means alarming.

So why the sudden chorus of critical voices?

The only real charge to be brought against Croatia is the problem of corruption. On that issue, however, the European Commission’s most rigorous assessments have been fairly positive. The one demand made by the Commission – that Croatia continue its fight against corruption and organised crime – is one that could be made of many EU members. Transparency International’s most recent corruption index puts Croatia ahead of Italy and indeed the whole of South East Europe, including EU members Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. Over the past three years, Croatia has taken action to root out at corruption at the heart of the state, issuing indictments against a former prime minister and deputy prime minister, various cabinet ministers, the head of the customs administration, numerous managers of state-run companies and even the former ruling party itself. This suggests a country that is seriously committed to tackling the difficult legacy of the
Tudjman era.

In fact, since 1999 Croatia has been undergoing a process of radical change to its political culture that goes far beyond the adoption of thousands of pages of EU legislation. In 1999, Croatia’s President Tudjman was still supporting the separatist ambitions of Croats in neighbouring Herzegovina, violating minority rights at home, suppressing media freedoms and obstructing the work of the
Hague Tribunal.

All this has now changed. Croatia has ceased to disrupt state-building in Bosnia, issuing a formal apology in 2010 for the war crimes committed there in Croatia’s name. It has allowed the return of Croatian Serb refugees, and in 2003 a Serb minority party even entered into a coalition government. It has completed the extradition of all those indicted by the Hague, including the most famous, General Ante Gotovina. In Belgrade, this year’s Gay Pride parade was once again cancelled; in Croatia, government ministers were visible participants in the parade.

Compared to 1999, Croatia is now a much more open and liberal society. It will fit into the European Union with no clash of political culture. But proceeding with Croatian accession is not just about rewarding these efforts. It is also a vital political message for Croatia’s Balkan neighbours. It shows what the path to Europe really consists of: visionary leadership and the courage to take political risks inspired by European values.

None of Croatia’s eastern neighbours are close to joining the EU. Only Montenegro has begun the negotiation process, which requires at least a decade to complete. But it is in the best interests of both the EU and the peoples of South Eastern Europe – in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Tirana and Pristina – that the promise of eventual accession remains a credible one. Because, as Croatia has demonstrated so powerfully, it is the accession process itself that offers the best prospects for lasting political change in the region.

The accession of Croatia in summer 2013 will not weaken the EU. On the contrary, the transformation of Croatia demonstrates the power of the EU to bring about lasting change in a region that is gradually emerging from its troubled history.

 

Why Croatia’s accession will strengthen the EU (in German)

Adriatic Croatia

Opinion piece (in German), 19 Oktober 2012

Warum Kroatiens Beitritt die EU stärken wird

Gerald Knaus und Kristof Bender

Den Anfang machte eine Schlagzeile der Frankfurter Allgemeinen am 9. Oktober: „Brüssel ermahnt Kroatien: ‚Bedingungen für Beitritt noch nicht erfüllt’.“ Dann meldete sich Gunther Krichbaum (CDU), Vorsitzender des Europaausschusses des Bundestages, zu Wort: “Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt ist das Land nicht beitrittsfähig.” Bundestagspräsident Norbert Lammert erklärte: “Wir müssen … den jüngsten Fortschrittsbericht der EU-Kommission ernst nehmen: Kroatien ist offensichtlich
noch nicht beitrittsreif.“ Und am 15. Oktober schrieb Martin Winter in der Süddeutschen Zeitung, dass Kroatien in der Tat „nicht reif genug ist“, doch dass der Zug schon abgefahren sei. „Nur leider: Lammert kommt mit seinem Einwurf ein wenig spät.“

Es sind beunruhigende Nachrichten, verstörende Warnungen: Wird die EU durch eine überhastete Aufnahme eines unvorbereiteten Landes geschwächt? Hat die EU heute nicht schon genug Probleme?

Kroatien ist ärmer als Deutschland oder Österreich. Allerdings ist sein Durchschnittseinkommen vergleichbar mit dem in Ungarn und höher als in allen anderen Ländern des Westbalkans oder als in Rumänien und Bulgarien.

Kroatien wurde während seiner Beitrittsverhandlungen mehr geprüft als jedes andere Land, das bislang versuchte der EU beizutreten. Es stellte seinen Antrag auf Aufnahme 2003. Vor dem Öffnen und Schließen der 35 Verhandlungskapitel mussten immer konkrete Reformen umgesetzt, nicht (nur) EU-konforme Gesetze verabschiedet werden.

War das Europäische Parlament blauäugig, als es Anfang Dezember mit 564 gegen 38 Stimmen für Kroatiens Aufnahme stimmte? Was ist den 16 EU Mitgliedsstaaten, die Kroatiens Beitrittsvertrag bereits ratifiziert haben, entgangen? Denn man kann davon ausgehen: wäre Kroatien heute noch nicht reif für die EU, dann würde es das wohl auch zum vorgesehenen Beitrittstermin im Sommer 2013 nicht sein. Ernste Probleme lassen sich nicht in ein paar Monaten beheben.

Doch um welche Probleme geht es eigentlich, aufgrund derer dieses kleine Land (mit gut 4 Millionen so viele Einwohner
wie Rheinland-Pfalz) eine mögliche Belastung für die EU darstellen könnte?

Ein oft hervorgehobenes Thema ist Korruption. Hier ist allerdings im Fall Kroatiens der Grundtenor des von Lammert zitierten Kommissionsberichtes positiv. Die einzige konkrete Forderung der Kommission ist eine Selbstverständlichkeit: Kroatien müsse den Kampf gegen Korruption und organisiertes Verbrechen fortsetzen. Im neuesten Korruptionsindex von Transparency International schneidet Kroatien so gut ab wie die Slowakei und besser als Italien und als alle anderen Länder Südosteuropas, einschliesslich der EU Mitglieder Griechenland, Bulgarien und Rumänien. In den letzten drei Jahren gab es eine Serie von Anklagen wegen Korruption, unter anderem gegen einen ehemaligen Premierminister, einen ehemaligen Vizepremier, gegen Minister, den Chef der Zollverwaltung, Manager von Staatsbetrieben und sogar gegen die frühere Regierungspartei. Natürlich gibt es weiter Korruption, in Kroatien so wie in Italien oder Österreich, aber es ist auch gerade in diesem Bereich sehr viel passiert.

Bezüglich der Umsetzung von EU-Gesetzgebung in Kroatien stellt der Kommissionsbericht fest: „Kroatien hat weitere Fortschritte in der Verabschiedung und Implementierung von EU Gesetzgebung gemacht und vollendet nun seine Angleichung mit dem acquis.“ Nicht alles ist gut: „Die Kommission hat Bereiche identifiziert, in denen weitere Bemühungen notwendig sind, und eine begrenzte Zahl von Aspekten, für die verstärkte Bemühungen erforderlich sind.“ Die Kommission nennt überdies noch zehn offene Punkte, auf die sie besonderen Wert legt, darunter die Vollendung der Privatisierung dreier Schiffswerften; die Verabschiedung eines neuen Informationszugangsgesetzes und einer Migrationsstrategie; den Ausbau zweier Grenzposten; oder weitere Anstellungen bei der Grenzpolizei (das wird, bis zu Kroatiens Schengenbeitritt, ein Thema bleiben).

Das sind alles sinnvolle Ziele. Doch entscheiden diese Punkte darüber, ob Kroatien als Mitglied die EU stärken oder schwächen würde?

Denn der tiefgreifendste und wichtigste Wandel in Kroatien seit 1999 ist neben der Umsetzung der EU Gesetze die Veränderung seiner politischen Kultur. Noch 1999 unterstützte Präsident Tudjman separatistische Kroaten in Bosnien. Er weigerte sich mit dem internationalen Strafgerichtshof zusammenzuarbeiten. Er trat Minderheitenrechte, Pressefreiheit und andere demokratische Grundwerte mit Füßen. Als er im Dezember 1999 starb, war sein Land international isoliert.

Danach begann sich Kroatien dramatisch zu verändern, angefangen mit der Politik gegenüber Bosnien. Die Rückkehr vertriebener Serben wurde ermöglicht. Es kam 2003 sogar zu einer Koalition zwischen Tudjman’s ehemaliger Partei, der HDZ, und der Partei der kroatischen Serben. Alle vom Den Haager Tribunal angeklagten mutmaßlichen Kriegsverbrecher
wurden ausgeliefert.

Kroatien ist heute ein anderes, offeneres, liberaleres Land als 1999. In Serbien werden weiterhin von manchen die Massaker in Bosnien in Frage gestellt. 2010 besuchte Kroatiens Präsident Josipovic hingegen Bosnien und bat für im Namen Kroatiens
begangene Verbrechen um Verzeihung. In Belgrad wurde die Gay Parade erneut abgesagt; in Kroatien nahmen Minister an der Parade in Split teil.

Genau darin aber liegt auch die wichtigste Botschaft eines kroatischen Beitritts an seine Nachbarn in Südosteuropa: um eines Tages EU-Mitglied werden zu können, braucht es Verantwortung, Führung und den Mut, politische Risiken einzugehen. Es
braucht Ausdauer und einen starken nationalen Konsens. Es ist in jedem Fall ein Marathonlauf, wenn nicht gar ein Triathlon, und kein Sprint.

Auf absehbare Zeit wird keiner von Kroatiens südlichen Nachbarn der EU beitreten. Verhandungen brauchen auf jeden Fall viele Jahre. Bislang ist es nur Montenegro gelungen, diese zu beginnen. Doch ist es im Interesse, sowohl der EU als auch der Region, dass dieses Ziel glaubwürdig bleibt, in Belgrad, in Sarajevo, in Tirana, in Skopje.

Der Beitritt Kroatiens im Sommer 2013 wird die EU nicht schwächen. Im Gegenteil, schon jetzt haben die Veränderungen im Land, die das Versprechen eines EU Beitritts verursacht hat, den Einfluss der EU in Südosteuropa gestärkt. Es gibt viele Gründe, sich über den Beitritt Kroatiens zu freuen und diesen als kleinen, aber wichtigen europäischen Erfolg zu sehen.

 

Am Sonntag, 21.10.2012, wird auf ORF 2 um 23.05 der von ESI mitgestaltete Dokumentarfilm „Kroatien: Heldendämmerung“, eine neue Folge der preisgekrönten Serie „Balkanexpress – Return to Europe“, ausgestrahlt.

Amazing Azerbaijan? Clips from a film and a presentation in New York

When Azerbaijan was admitted to the Council of Europe, despite well documented democratic failings, it was with the idea that Council of Europe membership would gradually transform Azerbaijan. Sadly, the reverse has occurred. The outcome is a tragedy for the citizens of Azerbaijan, particularly those brave pro-democracy activists who languish in jail as political prisoners. But it is also a tragedy for Europe, whose values have been trampled.  And it is certainly a tragedy for the Council of Europe itself, which urgently needs to recover the values its founders entrusted it with if it is to justify its continued existence.

Azerbaijan is the focus of a public debate in New York on “Fixing the Democracy Discourse: How Autocratic Regimes Undermine Democratic Institutions in the West”, organised by the Open Society Foundations on 28 June.

Speakers:

  • Gerald Knaus, Director, European Stability Initiative, Istanbul
  • Khadija Ismayilova, Investigative Journalist, Baku
  • Ken Silverstein, Author and Open Society Fellow, Washington, DC
  • Lincoln Mitchell, Associate Research Scholar, Columbia University, New York (moderator)

Please find out more about the event on OSI’s website.

 

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Malcolm Bruce: Council of europe and Azerbaijan – a broken promise

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Agim Khalil: Dissidents in danger in Baku

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Khadija Ismayilova: Speaking the truth – and running huge risks

Op-ed in Süddeutsche Zeitung on visa free travel for Turkey: Ein Fahrplan für die Reisefreiheit

SZ, Gerald Knaus - Ein Fahrplan für die Reisefreiheit - 26 April 2012

Ein Fahrplan für die Reisefreiheit

Die Visumspflicht der Europäischen Union für Bürger der Türkei ist Unsinn. Sie sollte endlich fallen

Von Gerald Knaus

Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26. April 2012

Jedes Jahr bemühen sich Hunderttausende Türken um ein Visum, um in die Europäische Union reisen zu können; im Jahr 2010 waren es mehr als 625000. Meist erhalten sie Visa, die zur einmaligen Einreise berechtigen und nur für wenige Tage gültig sind; manchmal wird ihnen die Einreise gänzlich verweigert. In jedem Fall sehen sie sich und ihr Land ungerecht behandelt. Zu Recht.

2008 begann die EU einen Prozess zur Liberalisierung der Visabestimmungen für die Staaten des westlichen Balkans. Diesen Ländern überreichte sie sogenannte Roadmaps, Fahrpläne. Diese definierten eine Reihe von Reformen als Vorleistung für die Reisefreiheit: Fälschungssichere Dokumente und ein besserer Grenzschutz gehörten dazu wie Asylgesetze nach EU-Standards und die Achtung der Menschenrechte. Auch sollte die Zusammenarbeit lokaler Sicherheitsbehörden mit jenen aus den EU-Staaten enger werden, umorganisierte Kriminalität, Menschenschmuggel und illegale Migration besser bekämpfen zu können. Am Ende wurde die Visumpflicht für Mazedonien, Serbien und Montenegro, Albanien und Bosnien aufgehoben. Mit der Türkei jedoch verweigert die EU bislang selbst Gespräche darüber, wie Türken die Einreise zu erleichtern wäre.

Dabei wäre es, folgt man der Logik, höchste Zeit, auch der Türkei eine Roadmap wie vor vier Jahren den Balkanländern zu geben – das Land ist schließlich mit der EU durch eine Zollunion und durch die Beitrittsverhandlungen bereits auf das engste verbunden. An diesem Donnerstag treffen sich die EU-Innenminister in Luxemburg. Sie sollten dort ihre bisherige Visumpolitik gegenüber der Türkei überdenken.

Die derzeitige Politik hat zwei große Schwächen. Zum einen läuft sie den rechtlichen Verpflichtungen der EU zuwider und wird von immer mehr Gerichten in Frage gestellt – vom Europäischen Gerichtshof und in den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, auch in Deutschland. Zum anderen verhindert sie eine Sicherheitspartnerschaft im beiderseitigen Interesse.

Beginnen wir mit der Rechtslage. Im August 2011 ordnete das Amtsgericht im oberpfälzischen Cham die sofortige Freilassung eines türkischen Staatsbürgers aus der Haft der Bundespolizei an. Der Betroffene verfügte über kein Visum und war aus Tschechien eingereist, um in Deutschland ein Auto zu kaufen. Das Gericht befand, dass der Betroffene sich auf die Visumfreiheit gemäß der sogenannten Standstill-Klausel berufen könne.

Das Gericht bezog sich auf ein Zusatzprotokoll zum Assoziationsabkommen zwischen der damaligen Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Türkei von 1963. Es besagte, dass “die Vertragsparteien untereinander keine neuen Beschränkungen der Niederlassungsfreiheit und des freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs einführen werden”. Der Autokauf des Türken sei eine erweiterte Dienstleistung, urteilten die Richter. Als das Protokoll 1973 in Kraft trat, gab es übrigens in elf der 27 heutigen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten keine Einreisebeschränkungen für Türken, auch nicht in Deutschland. Diese wurden erst 1980 eingeführt, unter Verletzung der Standstill-Klausel.

Im Februar 2009 entschied der Europäische Gerichtshof, dass die türkischen Lastwagenfahrer Mehmet Soysal und Ibrahim Savatli als Dienstleister kein Visum benötigten, um nach Deutschland einzureisen. Das Münchner und das niederländische Verwaltungsgericht Haarlem stellten 2011 in zwei getrennten Verfahren fest, dass türkische Touristen und Geschäftsleute kein Visum benötigen. Im Januar 2011 sprach das Amtsgericht Hannover einen inhaftierten Türken frei, der ohne Visum eingereist war. Im Juni 2011 kam ein Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Dienstes des Bundestags zu dem Schluss, es dürfte durch die Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs endgültig geklärt sein, “dass türkische Staatsangehörige visumfrei in das Bundesgebiet einreisen und sich ohne Aufenthaltstitel dort aufhalten dürfen.”

Solche Entscheidungen häufen sich derzeit vor deutschen und niederländischen Gerichten. Auch Leyla Demirkan, eine türkische Jugendliche, die ihren deutschen Stiefvater und ihre türkische Mutter besuchen wollte, als diese wegen einer Krankenhausbehandlung des Mannes in Stuttgart war, erhielt kein Visum von Deutschland. Ihr Fall, der nun vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof verhandelt wird, könnte die Visumspflicht bald gänzlich zu Fall bringen.

Experten wissen das, doch in vielen europäischen Innenministerien wird dies lieber verschwiegen. Dort hält man die visafreie Einreise von türkischen Staatsbürgern für ein Sicherheitsrisiko – auf jeden Fall sei sie den Bürgern schwer zu vermitteln. Das sind wenig rationale Argumente, wie überhaupt die derzeitige Politik der EU angesichts der Sicherheitsinteressen Europas irrational ist.

Erst vor kurzem haben die europäischen Innenminister wieder einmal darauf hingewiesen, dass die Sicherung der griechisch-türkischen Grenze eines der größten Probleme der Schengenzone ist. Im vergangenen Jahr wurden dort mehr als 61000 illegale Einwanderer aufgegriffen – vor allem Afghanen, Algerier und Somalier. Und keine Türken. Tatsächlich verlassen inzwischen mehr Türken Deutschland, als Menschen aus der Türkei ins Land kommen. Oft vergessen wird auch, dass das Durchschnittseinkommen in der Türkei über dem aller jener Balkanländer liegt, deren Bürger bereits ohne Visum reisen dürfen.

Die EU braucht keine Visumpflicht für türkische Bürger. Sie braucht stattdessen die enge Zusammenarbeit der Türkei mit der EU-Grenzagentur Frontex, um die illegale Einwanderung nach Griechenland zu stoppen. Würde die Europäische Kommission der Türkei eine Roadmap wie den Staaten des Westbalkans anbieten, wäre dies ein Anreiz für eine solche Zusammenarbeit. Von einem Liberalisierungsprozess mit klaren Vorgaben könnten alle Seiten profitieren. Die angestoßenen Reformen würden auch die Menschenrechtslage in der Türkei verbessern und das Vertrauen zwischen der Türkei und der EU wiederherstellen. Dies ist einem Szenario vorzuziehen, in dem der Europäische Gerichtshof den Mitgliedsstaaten die Aufhebung der Visabeschränkungen schlicht auferlegt.

Es geht um gemeinsame Sicherheitsinteressen und um den Respekt vor bestehendem Recht. Beides ist im Interesse der EU-Innenminister. Und vor allem im Interesse der Bürger Europas.

Gerald Knaus, 41, ist Vorsitzender der Europäischen Stabilitätsinitiative (ESI) und leitet das Visa Roadmap Turkey Projekt von ESI und der Stiftung Mercator.

PDF download: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Gerald Knaus, “Ein Fahrplan für die Reisefreiheit” (26 April 2012)

The Balkan employment catastrophy. A joint appeal with Kori Udovicki

Kori Udovicki Leskovac
Kori Udovicki (UNDP) – Declining industries in Leskovac

 

Media reactions to this appeal:

 

Kori Udovicki, a former Governor of the National Bank of Serbia and former Minister of Energy, who had worked as an economist for the IMF and had set up and run an economic think tank in Belgrade, has since 2007 been Assistant Secretary-General and Assistant Administrator of UNDP responsible for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). We  met a few times in recent months to discuss economic development issues in the Balkans: in New York, in Paris and most recently in Bruges. As we talked we quickly discovered that we shared a very similar approach to these issues, even though we looked at them from different perspectives and experiences.

As Kori told me, after a long career as a macroeconomist, with a PhD in economics from Yale under her belt, she had grown increasingly sceptical about the conventional economic policy advise that had been offered to Balkan countries in recent years. It is not that this advise is not sound, but that it is dangerously limited. Yes, macroeconomic stability is important, crucial even. Yes, privatisation and indeed liquidation of loss making companies was needed (and indeed often took much too long in the Balkans). And yes, it cannot harm if it is easier and quicker to register a new business. But these prescriptions alone will not be enough to create the jobs and reverse a disastrous process of deindustrialisation from which the Balkan region has suffered in the past two decades.

I had long felt the same, and this sense of unease was recently reinforced after a conference debating economic policy in the region in the wake of the global financial crisis organised by the Central Bank of Greece in Athens. There, in the presence of governors of Central Banks from across South East Europe, numerous speakers pointed out the need to rethink the current growth model in the region. They warned that what had happened in recent years, consumer credit driven growth, was not going to work in the future.  And yet, there remained a vagueness in the debate about an alternative and yet credible approach to growth.

And so Kori and myself put our heads together, debated, discussed and sent drafts across the atlantic to produce something we called an “appeal” concerning the employment crisis in the Balkans. This text benefitted hugely from debates with and research undertaken by my ESI colleagues, in this case in particular Kristof Bender and Eggert Hardten. It also benefitted from feedback at a seminar at the College d’Europe recently in Bruges, where I had been invited to present ideas to the senior staff of UNDP working in South East Europe. Above all it benefitted from the long debates, continued over skype, with Kori.

We certainly hope that this will be a useful and provocative small contribution to an inportant topic; one that concerns arguably the biggest structural threat to a lasting stabilisation of the Balkans.

 

The Balkan Employment Crisis—an urgent appeal

(Oped by Kori Udovicki and Gerald Knaus)

Leskovac, once known as the Serbian Manchester, is home to a textile industry that began in the 19th century, flourished under communism, and survives – albeit barely – till today. The town, which lies in the south of Serbia, boasts a textile school (set up in 1947), an association of textile engineers, and its very own textile magazine. The boom years are a distant memory, however. Leskovac’s socialist-era companies are bankrupt, their production halls empty, their machines dismantled and sold as scrap metal.

In the past two decades Leskovac has seen its population decline from 162,000 (1991) to less than 140,000. The drop in the working-age population has been disproportionately
high, and unemployment has increased. At the heart of the town’s plight, and that of so many other regions in the Western Balkans, is the impact of dramatic de-industrialization.

Contemporary Serbia is a society whose population is both aging (with an average age of 41, it is one of the oldest in the world) and shrinking.   So is its industry.  A recent article in the local press cites that 98 large, complex, industrial companies have shut down over the past two decades. And, most worrisomely, so is total employment.  After stagnating throughout the economic recovery of the 2000s, it has been sharply declining since 2008.  Today the employment rate is down to about 45 per cent, more than 20 per cent below the EU average.  Half of the young are unemployed.  In the textile and clothing sector, the number of workers has collapsed from 160,000 in 1990 to around 40,000 in 2010.

Serbia’s textile industry is representative of much of its industry, and Serbia’s labor market trends are representative of those in all the post-Yugoslav states.  The employment rate in Albania is also one of the lowest in Europe.

It is true that Europe’s textile industry has been put on the defensive by the emerging Far East.  However, it would be wrong to conclude that Serbia’s textile industry’s decline has been inevitable. In recent decades, the sector – one of the most highly globalized in the world – has seen employment shift from Germany to Poland, from Hong Kong to China, from Italy to Hungary and Turkey, and then to Bulgaria and Romania. In many peripheral regions across South East Europe, textiles have been a recent locomotive of growth and exports, creating hundreds of thousands of low-skilled jobs. The question we need to ask is why so few of these jobs have found their way to the Western Balkans.  Bulgaria was able to increase its exports in the textile and clothing sector from 280 million USD to more than 2 billion US between 1990 and 2010, contributing more than 100,000 industrial jobs.  Why hasn’t this been possible in Serbia, Bosnia or Albania? The same questions could be asked about other industries in the Balkans. Why are there more than 10,000 jobs in the furniture industry in the Central Anatolian city of Kayseri, far from any woods, but not in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Why are household appliance producers doing well in Slovenia, Western Romania and Western Anatolia, but not in the Western Balkans? How about agro-processing for the EU market? And what about Bosnia’s armaments industry, the mainstay of its industry in the past? Was its collapse really inevitable?

One answer is that the growth model adopted in the Western Balkans over the last decade has discouraged governments from asking such specific questions. Driven by distrust of the legacy of socialist planning, as well as by fear of state capture by corrupt businesses and corruption in the administration, the preferred economic policies have been hands-off, focusing not on specific sectors of the economy but on the general business environment. Policymakers have been praised for avoiding the temptation to shield declining areas of the economy from the discipline of the market. At the same time they found it hard to acknowledge when many former socialist businesses were past the point of possible recovery, overburdened by their debts and in urgent need of liquidation. Neither the political debates nor the legal framework in the region acknowledged that liquidation, sometimes, is the best way to ensure that existing resources—people and capital—remain in use, by being re-employed in the new growing private sector.

These key ingredients of the standard recipes of economic policy in the past decade are important, of course: a stable macroeconomic environment and a good business climate, in
which it is easier to open and close businesses, are a necessary condition for sustained recovery.  But they are not sufficient. In a region ravaged by conflict and the sheer length of economic decline, a policy mix of “hands-off”, “rules-based” privatization and deregulation cannot be sufficient to launch sustained economic recovery. Even during the periods of relative economic growth and high FDI inflows, the employment generated by the new, entrepreneurial private sector was not sufficient to offset the jobs shed by the slowly restructuring and privatized old industries. The financial crisis of 2008 has wiped out more than the jobs generated in the recovery period, even if informal job generation is taken into
account.

While the recovery lasted, there was a hope that FDI would yet accelerate and begin to generate more employment.  Now, however, it is clear that the growth model needs to be changed.  This has been noted by international institutions, most explicitly the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). More importantly, regional policymakers, under increasing pressure to generate jobs, have begun reaching for desperate measures, such as large, blanket, subsidies for foreign investors.  This is the kind of step that has so often in the past given industrial policy a bad name.

What would an alternative model of economic growth look like? In answering this question, it helps to keep in mind that there is not, in fact, one simple answer.  Each time, the answer depends on the context. Clearly, the key is the inclusion into global chains of industrial production.  Credible industrial policies are needed to define ways of encouraging the mobile global investments to those sectors – from food processing to clothing, from furniture to basic engineering assembly – where declining industrial regions in the Balkans possess a comparative advantage. For this one needs a better understanding of the drivers behind the industrial jobs that are already being generated.  In Leskovac, for example, over the past five years new jobs have been linked to investments by companies from Germany, South Korea and Turkey.

The question then becomes: what could be done to turn the trickle into a flood?  Comparative advantages are likely to be still hiding in the remnants of the past. Declining industries have left behind redundant workers and educational institutions without the skills and resources needed to adjust to a new marketplace. Provincial cities like Leskovac lack foreign contacts.   However, the right initiatives and support can deliver the necessary resources at a fraction of the costs that it would take to create a conducive environment “from scratch”.

A competent industrial development agency, modelled, for example, on the Irish Industrial Development Agency (IRA) could do this job.  The key word here is “competent”. It would have to be able to offer support and advice – based on credible and painstaking sectoral analysis – to local administrations and companies.  It would need to help educate local governments about ways of attracting investors.  It could also offer grants for private sector management training, to enable their companies to move up the value chain in
different sectors of production.

This is not an easy task. However, there is no reason to assume that such competence in the Western Balkans could not be put together and built up. For this, however, it is necessary, that a new philosophy for the role of industrial policy in economic growth be embraced.  This can only be done by the policymakers and governments of the countries themselves.

The EU could also help, however. All too often in the past two decades, the message coming across from EU officials and international financial institutions has, instead, been one of blanket discouragement of government intervention. The EU could do more to support the countries’ ability to develop and pursue credible multiyear strategies in a whole range of sectors, including agriculture and rural development, transportation, environment, and regional development. During the last enlargement wave, each candidate country integrated such strategies into a National Development Plan (NDP), which functioned both as a national roadmap and as a programming document for EU assistance. Such an approach would benefit the countries of the Western Balkans, where the public sector suffers from a dearth of planning capacity and resources for policy development.

Last but not least, the credibility of Western Balkan integration into the EU market could be enhanced. For the Western Balkans, the last few years have seen agonizingly slow progress in this area, with no country other than Croatia having so much as opened EU accession talks. The more realistic the perspective of EU membership for countries such as Serbia or Albania, the bigger the incentives for those interested in long-term investments in industrial production in the Balkans.

Integration with the EU market will be a critical anchor for economic development in the Balkans, but it will take more to ensure convergence. The example of Greece shows that
integration and access to funds is not enough. Greece is currently not able to absorb more than a third of EU structural and cohesion policy funding, because it has never benefited from the massive capacity-building and institutional support that has been given to the Fifth enlargement countries and Croatia. Looking on to the Western Balkan batch, the EU may consider increasing this support, emphasizing the administrative capacity for medium-term development in policy planning and coordination. Bringing development planning
into an earlier stage of the current accession process would allow each Balkan country to focus on the assessment of its competitiveness in agriculture and industry, and learn about the  constraints to development faced by these sectors.

None of this is to suggest that there is a silver bullet for job creation. The Balkan development challenge is enormous, and there are deep structural reasons behind the staggeringly low rates of employment in the region – some reaching back into the 1980s and the very nature of socialist industrialisation. Reversing the long-term trend of employment decline is a generational project, made all the more difficult by the current cyclical conditions in Europe. But reindustrialisation has taken place in recent years in a number of new member states or candidates, from Poland to Slovakia. Numerous industrial development clusters – from Timisoara in Western Romania to the Istanbul region and many Anatolian tiger cities in Turkey – have seen growth and success. In all these cases, political elites at the national and local level have made the integration of local businesses into global chains of industrial production a strategic priority.

The lack of employment opportunities today in the Western Balkans is generating quiet despair, especially among the young.  Without radical change, without a serious and visible commitment to a new set of policies, the sense if despair now palpable in the region may become burning.  There is, in fact, no greater, more urgent, social and economic issue in the Balkans. Fortunately, experiences of successful industrial recoveries and turnarounds abound.  Learning from them could turn around the fate of people in Leskovac, and countless other towns just like it.

Land borders in Europe. A dramatic story in three acts

Progress achieved in making European borders less onerous for travellers has long been seen as one of the most tangible successes of European integration. In recent months this progress has been been put into question, however, leading some to wonder whether the very basic ideas behind Schengen and various visa liberalisation agreements are likely to survive a rise in mistrust. This has serious implications; for citizens of Schengen member states, but also for all those Europeans who are still on the outside looking in, envious of the ease of travel that has been created in half of their continent, and wondering if the European border revolution of the last quarter century is already in retreat before it ever reaches them.

On 14 June 1985, the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders between Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, was signed on board the cruise ship 'Princesse Marie-Astrid', moored at Schengen, Luxembourg. Photo: plaza.lu On 14 June 1985, the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders between Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, was signed on board the cruise ship ‘Princesse Marie-Astrid’, moored at Schengen, Luxembourg. Photo: plaza.lu

Today most Europeans move more freely across their continent than at any time since modern borders and passports were first invented. In the rhetoric of many far right parties the vision of a borderless Europe has always, however, been less a dream than a nightmare. There is Marine Le Pen, leader of the French Popular Front, demanding that France “leave the Schengen treaty. It is obvious: massive anarchic and uncontrolled immigration is one of the breeding grounds of insecurity.” There is the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, Karl Heinz Strache, calling for more national border controls to be put in place, “following the recent example of Denmark.” This is not a new position, of course: Strache, and others like him, also opposed all previous enlargements of the Schengen area, and indeed the European Union itself. It is only recently, however, that the wider debate appears to be moving in their direction. If even the Danes call for a reimposition of national border controls, why not French, Finns or Austrians as well?

Recent months have seen quarrels between Italy and France linked to refugees from North Africa; the blocking of the Ventimiglia frontier by France on 17 April; acrimonious debates on the accession to the Schengen treaty of Romania and Bulgaria, once again postponed; the announcement by a Danish government of plans to restore controls along Danish borders; and concern about the increase in asylum applications from Balkan countries, after these countries were granted visa free travel. Even EU foreign ministers sounded warnings about the looming collapse of Schengen. All of this took place against a background of growing anxieties about the future of the Euro and the European project itself.

And so questions were raised: is the project of a “Europe without borders” another expression of technocratic hubris, another idealistic vision thought up by over-enthusiastic jet-setting elites, not actually supported by the majority of citizens fearful of its unintended consequences? Or is the real issue diminishing trust among European elites, as the Polish interior minister put it recently in the context of debates about Romania and Bulgaria, which, he noted, had been promised to be accepted into Schengen once they met all requirements:

“Today, two member states made it impossible to make a decision on Schengen enlargement. This takes us to a sad conclusion about mutual confidence between member states … We’ve known since April that they have met the requirements. Today, the promise was broken.”

As the Economist put it in April:

“The euro zone and the Schengen area depend on trust: that each member will run sound public finances, and that each will control its borders. When trust breaks down, integration is in trouble.”

The Danish border with Germany The Danish border with Germany

When even Danes and French fear open borders with Germany or Italy, respectively, and when even Romania and Bulgaria, EU members since 2007, cannot rely on promises made to them solemnly by other member states: is it wise to expect any further bold steps towards freedom of movement from such a Union? Or does this deprive all those who do not yet enjoy freedom of movement in Europe of the hope that things will ever change?

 

Schengen as a never-ending crisis

And yet: sometimes even a seemingly obvious conclusion – “Schengen is in crisis because Europe is in crisis” – is still misleading. Schengen is not in fact facing an unprecedented crisis. It is highly unlikely to ever be dismantled and most likely to continue to expand.  It is also likely that this process will be challenged and hotly debated every step of the way. All of this reflects the way Schengen has actually developed for more than two decades: incrementally, slowly, focused on security concerns in the light of public anxieties, in a process shaped strongly by European ministries of interior.

Schengen was not perceived by those promoting it as a matter of prioritizing freedom over security, or of idealism trumping realism. It was always defined as serving (also) national interests.  Progress became possible when ways were found to demonstrate that more freedom could coincide with increased security for existing members. Progress was therefore slow or came to a halt when argument was made in purely abstract terms and not in terms of actual security concerns.

Arguably, Schengen was “in crisis” from the very moment it was created. As Ruben Zaiotti put it in an illuminating recent essay (The Beginning of the End? The Italo-French Row over Schengen and the Lessons of Past ‘Crises’ for the Future of Border Free Europe) “the current crisis’ patterns and dynamics are consistent with the trajectory that Schengen has followed in the past.” (for a video presentation Ruben made for a recent ESI event on this topic, please go here).

Looking back shows the patterns Ruben Zaiotti refers to. There is France, a founder and, together with Germany, inventor of the Schengen concept, having serious doubts about actually implementing the very protocol it co-drafted and which was ratified in 1993. Relying on article 2.2. of the Schengen Implementation Convention, French politicians declared throughout the 1990s that they would be forced to maintain control over land borders with Belgium and Luxembourg in the interest of national security. As Herve de Charette, French foreign minister, put it in September 1995: “If it seems, as it is the case, that our citizens security depends also on the border controls, it is understood that we have to keep them.”

There were debates about the “Schengen Flop” in 1994: as one report at the time noted:

“the entry into force of the Schengen Implementing Agreement has been postponed for the third time and sine die … squabbling among the member states following the announcement of the postponement indicates that political and commercial rivalries exacerbated by a lack of institutional and public control inherent to the Schengen process, are more likely to be at the root of the debacle. “

Schengen, a debacle before it had even begun to be put into place?!

This was followed by further debates in 1996, as France continued to hold out in its increasingly isolated skepticism. More than a decade after the Schengen declaration was signed in 1985 there were still French border guards checking travellers from Belgium!  There was also a serious risk in 1996 that Norway would not accept Schengen and that this would sink all Scandinavian participation in the project.

The reason France did eventually lift border controls with Belgium was not due to an infection with Euro-idealism or to the sudden absence of right-wing challenges. As the father of Marine Le Pen, Jean Marie Le Pen, put it in 1998, when he was riding high in the polls: “Schengen opens the doors to drugs and insecurity as well as to immigrants and refugees from all over the world.”

There was never a golden age in which Schengen was not contested. But in the end, despite serious debates, the French, Norwegians, Swiss all decided that it was in their national self-interest to belong to this club. Real progress became possible in the end because it became obvious even to cautious (French and other) policy makers that wherever Schengen had been put in place, it actually worked: the benefits were real for French citizens and the risks manageable. The fact that, following the lifting of border controls with the Benelux, France was not flooded by drugs helped build confidence. Similar experiences changed perceptions in Germany and other countries worried about the  effects of abandoning national border control.

Helmut Kohl and Romano Prodi
Helmut Kohl and Romano Prodi

The difficulties Romania and Bulgaria face in joining Schengen are also not unprecedented. When Italy, a member of the G7 and a founding member of the EU, formally applied to join Schengen in 1987 it took a decade (!) for its application to be approved by its partners, especially the ever skeptical Germans. Germany’s interior minister (and the influential Lander ministries) at the time had serious concerns about Italian laxness. Germany also insisted on the drafting of detailed questionnaires to be filled out by all applicants, including Italy, in order to assess their state of preparedness. Even after Italy met all conditions, Germany remained reluctant to give its approval. As Romano Prodi told me earlier this year in an interview in his hometown Bologna, he appealed directly to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at a meeting in Innsbruck in July 1997, going over the head of Kohl’s interior minister. Nor were Germans easily prepared to entrust their Austrian neighbours with managing Schengen’s external border on their behalf. As the interior minister of Bavaria at the time, Gunther Beckstein, recalled in a meeting in Munich this summer, it took a serious effort for Austrian leaders – and their “clever initiative” to invite Bavarian border police to help their Austrian colleagues in preparing for Schengen – to build trust and make German leaders feel at ease.  Today Beckstein, looking back, leaves no doubt that Schengen did not come at the price of German insecurity and constitutes an important success. It is also, in his view, very hard to reverse along the German-Austrian (or any other long) border: the German border police has been completely transformed. Countless new border crossings have emerged for citizens to take advantage of their new freedom to move.  Schengen Europe has become part of a new reality, accepted by police as well as by ordinary citizens in their daily lives.

Güther Beckstein
Günther Beckstein

How about the recent Danish proposal? The Danish insistence on restoring border controls, announced in spring, shocked many of its European partners. Again, some saw in this a sign of a wider unravelling of Schengen. EU officials expressed “extreme concern.” This triggered a fresh debate about the conditions under which member states could “temporarily” restore border controls. In the end, this debate lead to a proposal, presented by the European Commission a few weeks ago. It suggested that in the future imposing temporary national border controls, beyond the very short term, would require European Commission approval. This, together with a regulation to further strengthen the European frontier agency FRONTEX, recently adopted by the European Parliament, would in fact mark another step towards further supranational governance of all land borders in the Schengen area.

It is unclear whether such a proposal can actually be accepted today; it may not be. What is clear is that the debate is not one about dismantling Schengen. A new Danish government has also, in the meantime, decided to refrain from restoring border controls. The new government’s common policy (Regeringsgrundlag) emphasised both Denmark’s commitment to the Schengen Agreement and the intention to cooperate with other EU countries on border controls on the basis of EU treaties and rules. It concluded that “the plans from May 2011 to erect new control systems at the Danish borders will not be implemented.”

 

Measuring Europe’s border revolution

Denmark has less than 70 km of land borders; this made threats to reimpose border controls more credible than similar announcements would have been if made by most other EU member states. To put recent debates on European borders in a wider historical context it is helpful to quantify some of the dramatic changes which have taken place on the continent and which have transformed its borders.

The first act in the recent European border story was the creation of new borders. In 1989 European land borders had a total length of 25,032 km. Then, following the collapse of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the total length of land borders in Europe went up to 37,409 km. This increase reflected the dramatic politics of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Most new borders were the result of a peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union, but some were contested and fought over bitterly. Even today some borders in the South Caucasus and in the Balkans – such as the border between Serbia and Kosovo, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or within Georgia – remain contested, with future outbreaks of violence always a possibility. These borders remain what borders have traditionally been in European history: a razor’s edge “on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death of nation” (Lord Curzon), a source of tensions and conflicts.

The second act involved the removal of old borders. In 1985 a pioneering group of five countries first agreed on the aim to “abolish checks at common borders and transfer them to their external borders.”  (Schengen Agreement). It then took another five years to agree on the Schengen Implementation Convention. Ratification of it lasted until late in 1993 and in march 1995 the Convention finally entered into force. Since then the area covered by the Schengen agreement has grown dramatically. The result is that since 1995 physical border controls have been dismantled on European land borders totaling 16,447 km. (see the table below for all Schengen borders in Europe today)

The third act is in fact still unfolding: it involves testing the limits of the vision of a borderless Europe on a continental scale. This is a vision of breathtaking ambition; it is obvious that it can only be brought about through incremental steps over a long period of time. It consists of both the ongoing enlargement of Schengen to the East (to all existing and future EU members) and of the process of linking the prospect of visa liberalisation for other European states with reforms and close security cooperation of these states, turning them over time into competent partners of the EU in addressing common security concerns.

José Manuel Barroso, President of the EC, took part in the celebrations for the enlargement of the Schengen area which were held in Zittau, a town on the border of Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic on 21 December 2007. Photo:  European Commission
José Manuel Barroso, President of the EC, took part in the celebrations for the enlargement of the Schengen area which were held in Zittau, a town on the border of Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic on 21 December 2007. Photo:  European Commission

In the most optimistic scenario, based on recent experiences, more European countries will one day follow the Polish path. After shacking off communist rule Poland first signed a readmission agreement (agreeing to take back illegal immigrants passing through its territory) in March 1991. It did this at the time with the small group of five original Schengen members. Following this Poland was granted visa free access to all of these states on 8 April 1991. In 2004 Poland joined the European Union; finally, in late 2007, Poland joined the Schengen zone as a full member. With this step the Polish land borders with Germany, but also with the Baltic states, became invisible.

 

The basic dynamic

If Schengen is not actually facing a “new” crisis, the same could be said about the wider European border revolution – including further visa liberalisation.  The best reason to be confident that it will continue is the fact that the basic dynamics which has made this policy a success until now remain in place: a desire by outsiders to participate in a success story and an interest by EU member states to obtain cooperation in managing common problems. But in the future as in the past this will require serious confidence building and efforts on the part of non-EU countries.

Already today the promise of visa liberalisation as a long-term result of visa dialogues with the EU is triggering reforms among some members of the Eastern Partnership process, such as Moldova. The same approach has worked successfully to bring about domestic security sector and border reforms in all Western Balkan states after 2007. Such trends make policing the external borders easier, and extend the EU justice and home affairs acquis further.

It is only as part of a vigorous debate on how this border revolution is actually making Europe safer that it is going to be politically viable and likely to continue. But then, this has never actually been different from now.

 

Further reading:

I strongly recommend a book by Ruben Zaiotti on the changing culture of border control in Europe: Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers.

A few weeks ago ESI and Erste Stiftung also recently organised a public debate in Vienna. For this event Ruben also prepared a presentation, which you can watch here:  Freedom of movement in Europe – dream or nightmare in a populist age? (the whole debate can be listened to online)

 

Taking the measure of Europe’s borders

 

European Land Borders length in km Schengen status in 2011
Land Borders in 1989
1 Spain – Portugal 1214 Schengen border
2 Spain – France 623 Schengen border
3 Spain – Andorra 63,7
4 Andorra – France 56,6
5 (France – Monaco) (4,4)
6 France – Italy 488 Schengen border
7 France – Switzerland 573 Schengen border
8 France- Germany 451 Schengen border
9 France – Luxembourg 73 Schengen border
10 France- Belgium 620 Schengen border
11 Belgium – Netherlands 450 Schengen border
12 Belgium – Germany 167 Schengen border
13 Belgium – Luxembourg 148 Schengen border
14 Luxembourg – Germany 138 Schengen border
15 Switzerland – Germany 334 Schengen border
16 Switzerland – Italy 740 Schengen border
17 Switzerland – Liechtenstein 41 Schengen border
18 Switzerland – Austria 164 Schengen border
19 (Italy – San Marino) (39)
20 Italy – Austria 430 Schengen border
21 Italy – Slovenia 199 Schengen border
22 Austria – Liechtenstein 35 Schengen border
23 Austria – Germany 784 Schengen border
24 Austria – Czech Republic 362 Schengen border
25 Austria – Slovakia 91 Schengen border
26 Austria – Slovenia 330 Schengen border
27 Austria – Hungary 366 Schengen border
28 Germany – Czech Republic 646 Schengen border
29 Germany – Poland 456 Schengen border
30 Germany – Denmark 68 Schengen border
31 Germany – Netherlands 577 Schengen border
32 Czech Republic – Poland 615 Schengen border
33 Slovakia – Poland 420 Schengen border
34 Slovakia – Ukraine 90
35 Slovakia – Hungary 676 Schengen border
36 Hungary – Ukraine 103
37 Hungary – Romania 443
38 Hungary – Serbia 166
39 Hungary – Croatia 329
40 Hungary – Slovenia 102 Schengen border
41 Montenegro – Albania 172
42 Albania – Macedonia 151
43 Albania – Kosovo 112
44 Albania – Greece 282
45 Greece – Macedonia 246
46 Greece – Bulgaria 494
47 Greece – Turkey 206
48 Turkey – Bulgaria 240
49 Turkey – Georgia 252
50 Turkey – Armenia 268
51 Turkey – Azerbaijan Naxcivan exclave 9
52 Macedonia – Bulgaria 148
53 Serbia – Bulgaria 318
54 Serbia – Romania 476
55 Romania – Bulgaria 608
56 Romania – Moldova 450
57 Romania – Ukraine 538
58 Ukraine – Poland 428
59 Belarus – Poland 605
60 Lithuania – Poland 91 Schengen border
61 Russia (Kaliningrad exclave) 432
62 Norway – Sweden 1619 Schengen border
63 Norway – Finland 727 Schengen border
64 Norway – Russia 196
65 Sweden – Finland 614 Schengen border
66 Finland – Russia 1313
67 United Kingdom – Ireland 360
Total land borders in 1989

24987,7

(without San Marino and Monaco)

New land borders since 1989
68 Czech Republic – Slovakia 197 Schengen border
69 Croatia – Serbia 241
70 Croatia – Bosnia and Herzegovina 932
71 Croatia -Montenegro 25
72 Croatia -Slovenia 455
73 Bosnia and Herzegovina – Serbia 302
74 Bosnia and Herzegovina – Montenegro 225
75 Montenegro -Serbia 124
76 Montenegro – Kosovo 79
77 Azerbaijan Naxcivan exclave – Armenia 221
78 Armenia – Georgia 164
79 Armenia – Azerbaijan 566
80 Georgia – Azerbaijan 322
81 Georgia – Russia 723
82 Azerbaijan – Russia 284
83 Macedonia – Serbia 62
84 Macedonia – Kosovo 159
85 Kosovo – Serbia 352
86 Ukraine – Moldova 940
87 Ukraine – Belarus 891
88 Ukraine – Russia 1576
89 Belarus – Russia 959
90 Belarus – Lithuania 680
91 Belarus – Latvia 171
92 Lithuania – Russia (Kaliningrad exclave) 227
93 Lithuania – Latvia 576 Schengen border
94 Latvia – Russia 292
95 Latvia – Estonia 343 Schengen border
96 Estonia – Russia 290
TOTAL new post-1989 land borders 12378
TOTAL pre and post 1989 land borders in 2011 37409
TOTAL Schengen borders in 2011 16447

 

Map of Schengen countries

A few words on methodology:

“European” land borders refers to the land borders of all European countries with each other.  “European” are all countries eligible to become or already members of the Council of Europe. This means that we counted the borders of Turkey with its European neighbours in the Balkans and in the South Caucasus, but not with Iraq or Iran. The same is true for Russia: we counted its European borders in the East and South, but not its borders with Central Asia.

One conceptual difficulty is posed by micro-states which are placed within EU member states: Monaco, San Marino, the Vatican. We decided to leave them out of the calculation, since even before 1989 there have been no real border regimes in place.

Andorra is not a member of Schengen.

In the case of Lichtenstein the border was traditionally managed by Switzerland, which is why we counted the border with Austria (but not the Lichtenstein-Swiss border).

Please do submit your comments and suggestions, however, how to improve the table and calculations, either here as a comment or to g.knaus@esiweb.org. We would be most grateful.

Special thanks to my colleague Melissa Panzi, who was with ESI in Istanbul and is currently studying the relationship between the US and Mexico along their land borders at the university in Monterrey.

A European call for recognition of a Palestinian state

23 members of the ECFR Council are among 41 prominent Europeans who have signed the following statement (in a personal capacity) calling for the recognition of a Palestinian state by European governments:

“In 2009 the Palestinian Authority embarked on a process to complete the building of the institutions of a prospective Palestinian State. The European Union has consistently encouraged and supported this endeavor, both in terms of financial and technical assistance and with respect to the political objective.

Today the question of the recognition of this state is before us. The Palestinian Authority has identified September 2011 as the conclusion of the state-building process, and the Palestinian leadership may solicit formal recognition of Palestinian sovereignty over the occupied territories from the United Nations and its Member States.

Should this request be made, the EU should support it, coupling it with a clear expectation that an independent Palestine would be prepared to conduct negotiations with Israel based on the internationally recognized parameters.

A majority of UN Member States have already recognized the Palestinian State but an EU recognition will make the difference.

The signatories of this text see that Europe has no argument to oppose this legitimate demand of the Palestinians. Denying them recognition of independent statehood after having supported and recognized that they have successfully worked towards this objective by building a coherent system of governance and cooperated with Israel on security matters would be contradicting our own positions and policies in a direct and unacceptable manner. European states have already signed up to the declaration within the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee and the World Bank that Palestine is ready for independence. Backtracking from this commitment now would demonstrate inconsistency, weakness and an absence of political will. It would also be to grant a victory to the status quo forces.

A growing number of Israelis, former security officials as well as prestigious figures from civil society, have recently been adding their voices to the choir of those who have endorsed recognition of Palestinian statehood and are calling for an end to occupation.

The terms of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement signed on 3 May 2011 between Fatah and Hamas suggest that a national unity government might be formed.

This should not be considered an obstacle; it might even act as an effective lever to encourage the evolution of the Hamas movement in the right direction.

The internationally agreed parameters of a peace agreement – which would lead to a secure Israel and a viable Palestine – were reiterated by President Obama in his speech of May 19. Yet no further indication was given by the United States as to how this outcome might be achieved and the bilateral process of negotiation has resulted in a stalemate.

European recognition of Palestinian sovereignty and independence, accompanied by the necessary financial support, will anchor the Palestinian polity firmly within the camp of peace and co-existence and enhance the stability of the region. At a moment when the European Union is working to redefine its relations with the societies of the region, Member states should not squander this opportunity to play a positive and meaningful role.

It is with these political and ethical considerations in mind that the signatories call upon European governments to extend recognition to Palestine in September of this year. “

Urban Ahlin, Sweden;  Martti Ahtisaari, Finland; Frans Andriessen, Netherlands;Giuliano Amato, Italy; Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Netherlands; John Bruton, Ireland;Hervé de Charette, France; Charles Clarke, United Kingdom; Aleš Debeljak, Slovenia;Uffe Elleman-Jensen, Denmark; Jean François-Poncet, France; Felipe Gonzales, Spain; Charles Grant, Unite Kingdom; Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Sweden; Lionel Jospin, France; Mary Kaldor, United Kingdom; Glenys Kinnock, United Kingdom; Gerald Knaus, Austria; Michael Lothian, United Kingdom; Louis Michel, Belgium; Christine Ockrent, Belgium;  Andrzej Olechowski, Poland; Romano Prodi, Italy; Andrew Puddephatt, United Kingdom; Mary Robinson, Ireland; Michel Rocard, France; Albert Rohan, Austria; Jorge Sampaio, Portugal; Pierre Schori, Sweden; Clare Short, United Kingdom; Peter Sutherland, United Kingdom; Loukas Tsoukalis, Greece; Erkki Tuomioja (signed before being appointed minister of foreign affairs on June 22nd), Finland; Andreas van Agt, Netherlands; Hans van den Broek, Netherlands; Michiel van Hulten, The Netherlands; Mabel van Oranje, The Netherlands; Hubert Védrine, chairman of the European Former Leaders Group, France;  Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Latvia;Richard von Weizsäcker, Germany; Carlos Alonso Zaldívar, Spain.

 

Speech at the Council of Europe: Turkey’s europeanisation and false ideas about the decline of Europe

Gerald Knaus at the Council of Europe. Photo: Council of Europe

On 10 February I was invited to speak at an informal meeting of policy planning directors from the foreign ministries of the Council of Europe member states in Strasburg.

In my presentation I focused on false ideas of European decline, the opportunities offered by developments in Turkey, and how these contradict notions of diminishing EU soft power in the past decade, and the power of a promise of inclusion for strengthening reform agendas.

The meeting was followed by a working lunch with Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe.

Please read my contribution here:

Introduction

As an analysis of the politics of the future is part of our business, I would like to start with a few reflections on the nature of predictions. I will then suggest some European macro trends for the forthcoming ten years, in particular the debate on Europe’s decline. In conclusion I will offer reflections on European soft power which is at the heart of European institutions like the Council of Europe, the European Union and others.

Several of the examples that I will use come from Turkey as I have been working and living there for six years. Furthermore, the issue of Turkey is at the heart of the current debate in Europe in both the relationship between Europe and Turkey and the relationship between European culture and the question of Islam and secularism.

The difficult business of prediction

In 2005, Philip Tetlock, an American political psychologist, published research which tracked the predictions of 284 leading policy experts in the United Sates over several years, noting some 28,000 predictions about the political future. He compared these with other benchmarks for accuracy.

His conclusions on how often the policy experts were right were sobering. First of all, it made very little difference to the accuracy of the predictions whether the experts were liberal or conservative, old or young, economists or lawyers, men or women. In fact, a delinquent or a monkey throwing darts at a dart board were often almost as right as the experts about some of these complicated issues. This underlines the fact that the future is difficult to predict.

Tetlock went on to suggest that there are two types of expertise; that of the fox and that of the hedgehog[1]. The fox has an intricate knowledge of many small things while the hedgehog has one big idea. As Tetlock put it, the hedgehog thinks he knows how the world works everywhere and always, based on a very clear ideological vision of the world. For example, they ‘know’ from history that it is never possible for multi-ethnic states to be put together in a democratic way after conflict, as John Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago suggested about Bosnia in 1995. They ‘know’ that counter insurgency strategies always work, or that the correct number of soldiers are deployed in proportion to the population for defeating an insurgency.

What would hedgehogs say about Turkey being a member of the European Union in 2020? Some hedgehogs may say this is impossible – enlargement is dead following the Dutch and French referendums rejecting the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. They suggest this was an earthquake which has shaken the foundations of enlargement and that there will be a train crash soon and the EU and Turkey will clash.

Of course, there could be a hedgehog with a different temperament, who would say that Turkey will be in the European Union by 2020 – every country that has started accession talks has acceded. There have always been doubts and questions, even about some of the richer countries that have applied.

How would a fox approach this specific question? A fox might come to a less interesting and spectacular conclusion. It might ask, what is a train crash really? How would a train crash happen? It could mean that the talks could stop in recrimination. But how could they stop? Well, the EU could decide to suspend them. But how could they suspend them? To do this the EU would need a qualified majority in the European Council, which is extremely hard, indeed near impossible, to obtain. So in fact whatever the nature may be of elections in different European countries, it seems very unlikely there will ever be a vote to suspend the talks.

So this leaves another option, which is for the talks to end because Turkey gets up and walks away. But how likely is that? Turkey did not walk away from the Council of Europe when it was criticised in the 1990s for its Human Rights record. It did not stop its Association Agreement with the European Union when Greece blocked the assistance Turkey had been promised. Why should Turkey walk away now when it has had its best economic run in decades, a corollary of its EU candidate status, and with its diplomatic prestige rising? Continuing Accession talks comes at relatively little cost. Direct foreign investment in the country has increased sharply and, as Turkey’s chief negotiator for EU accession says, they do not have the luxury of suspending the talks. Let the others throw away the key. The conclusion from this analysis is that the most likely outcome ten years from now is that the talks will still be ongoing.

As suggested in a recent report of the European Stability Initiative[2], Turkey and the EU are already married in a Catholic marriage where divorce is not an option. So the real question is whether the marriage goes through a happy or not so happy phase. There may occasionally be some infidelity; Turkey may appear to be flirting with somebody in the in the Middle East for a short period of time. But then Turkey will realise that it is in fact married with the EU and doesn’t want to get divorced. The Europeans will realise that there are real advantages for them in this union too. So the next ten years might not bring us anything very spectacular.

The problem for foxes is that the status quo is usually more stable than it looks. However, in times of turmoil or stress we feel instinctively uncomfortable with this notion. We ask ourselves, shouldn’t we have predicted 1789? Shouldn’t we have predicted 1914? Shouldn’t we have predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall? Shouldn’t we have predicted the uprising in Egypt? Aren’t foxes just cowards who do not put their convictions on the table?

The problem for hedgehogs is that predicting change, and the drama of change, very often leads to quite serious misconceptions which exaggerate our fears. Michael Ignatieff, writer and analyst at the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy, wrote in 2003 that America after 9/11 felt a tremor similar to that felt in the ancient world when the barbarians arrived;  an imperial people awoke to the menace of the barbarians existing just beyond a zone of stable democratic states. The World Trade Center and the Pentagon are the headquarters and the barbarians from the border zones are inflicting devastating damage.

Another well-known pundit, British historian Neil Ferguson, wrote about waning empires, religious revivals, insipient anarchy and a retreat into fortified cities. These are experiences from the dark ages. These fears and exaggerated notions of dramatic change in the world have had an impact on policy and that is part of our story; when fears are exaggerated there is a tendency to react to them and to make bad policy.

There is a further problem for the foxes in the claim that they don’t actually predict anything. The media, on the other hand, like bold statements, ideological combat and grand theories. Bold statements make good sound bites, and they certainly make good television. Once you are famous, and this is the most interesting finding in the research, it doesn’t actually matter how often you are wrong, you will continue to be invited because you’re interesting.

Crashes, breakdowns and dramatic events are rewarded in the current media market. As a result we do not always hear the policy analyses of foxes, for example experts in foreign ministries or think-tanks who are not trying to chase the latest headline. Nor do we hear the public debate which includes what very intelligent and serious people, based at respected institutions, are saying. Thus, you will have heard that for six years Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country on the brink of a serious crisis. You wonder how many years can a country balance on the brink like this? You may have heard this is the make or break year in Afghanistan, and that if there is no breakthrough NATO will collapse.

The problem for foxes is that they might not be able to predict in advance that NATO would collapse in five years time.  But then again, they haven’t predicted the collapse of Canada, India, or civil war in Ukraine either. If you are a fox, you might even believe that Belgium, always on the brink, will still be here ten years from now as a rather successful place with good food, a good health service and some of the wealthiest people in the world, who turn out to be rather hard to excite.

The decline of Europe?

There is a strong hedgehog discourse about European decline. It is rather an old discourse, and before examining what this means for policy, a short reflection on the nature and the notion of decline is required.

Alan Weisman[3] imagines a world without human beings and asks what would happen in this case. Taking the island of Manhattan as an example, he notes that pumps remove 49 million litres of water every day to stop the New York Subway from flooding. Weisman claims that without the pumps the Subway would flood within one day. If human beings disappear, the pumps no longer work, the tunnels would be submerged in a day. Within twenty years the steel columns which support the streets above the Subway would buckle, pipes would burst, buildings would groan, bolts would rust, there would be fires and within a period of forty to fifty years, New York would begin to revert to a semi-forest.

If human beings disappeared, Europe too would turn into a Grimm brother’s fairytale forest. However, there is a deeper point here, which is that decline is not a policy problem to be solved, decline is inherent in the human condition. This is interesting because it means that this discourse and fear of decline might in fact be that which keeps civilisations alert. This is what makes them effective, careful, prudent and struggling forward.

Take demography, a hard science; we know the predictions and we know who will be in Europe in 2050 because they are already born, give or take the migrants. By 2050 the population in the European Union will decline by 57 million, not including migration. The working population will decline by 88 million. It is hard to imagine what this really means. Some people, however, claim to know exactly what this means. A 2005 article in the Washington Post suggested that in a century from now there will not be many Germans in Germany or Italians in Italy[4].

The paradox here is that we are dealing with a wonderful phenomenon; life expectancy has risen dramatically over the last century. Rainer Münz, a leading demographer, has pointed out that if current trends continue, life expectancy is going to rise by a further twenty years over the course of the next century. This means that for every year you survive, another three months is added to your life expectancy. Every day we gain at least one to two additional hours, so in a 24 hour period I will gain additional hours which I can live at the end of my life!

The probability of my daughter reaching 90 years is extremely high; Europeans have the chance of seeing their grandchildren grow to an old age. However, this creates problems; in Austria, for example, the effective age of retirement is 58 and the number of women in the work force is extremely low. This is not sustainable.

Behind the demographic crisis is a very positive trend; we are living longer and healthier lives. A recent article in the Economist magazine identified a U-bend in happiness[5]. It presented research which shows that as people get older, they also tend to get happier. This means that Europe is, and will become, a happier continent over the next few years.

A second decline-related theme is competitiveness; before the last economic crisis the suggestion was that Europe cannot compete with the US because it has too much regulation and has not liberalised its market sufficiently. Now there are doubts too about the resilience of the US-style free-market model.

The third theme concerns the impact of migration. Thilo Sarrazin’s book, ‘Deutschland schafft sich ab’ (Germany does away with itself) has become one of Germany’s best-selling non-fiction book in recent decades. Its success confirms that there is an audience for the message. In an interview in 2009 Thilo Sarrazin stated “The Turks are conquering Germany in the same way the Kosovars conquered Kosovo: by using higher birth-rates. I would like this if it would be Eastern European Jews who have an IQ which is 15 points higher than the one of the German population.” But, he continues, the reality is that the lower the social class, the higher the birth rate. The birth rate amongst Arabs and Turks is two to three times higher that of their corresponding share in the wider population. This type of discourse, bordering on racism, is on the rise. As social tensions are coming to the fore and multiculturalism is increasingly controversial, Sarrazin’s viewpoint locks into a central fear: that majorities in European countries are beginning to feel that they will soon be minorities. This is making them act like minorities; they are displaying a sense of nervousness and behaving as if they are under siege.

What does this mean for the culture clashes which have been forecast and for the crisis of multiculturalism? The headlines suggest that something dramatic is happening, for example when Angela Merkel claimed in 2010 at a meeting of her party’s youth wing that multiculturalism is dead[6]. At the same time, Christian Wulff, the German Federal President, reasserted that Islam has become part of German culture, following the line of Wolfgang Schäuble, then Minister of the Interior, who in 2006 confirmed the right of Muslims to build mosques throughout Germany. Indeed, there are about 180 new mosques being built in Germany, which will come in addition to the 150 existing ones and the 3000 prayer rooms in the country.

We are seeing, for example through the reactions to Thilo Sarrazin and his theses, a relatively robust political elite that, overall, is responding in a pragmatic way with very specific reforms. Even Thilo Sarrazin recommends a few things that reasonable people would not be unwilling to discuss, for example, more language education and more money for kindergartens. So even on this debate there is a natural adjustment to quite dramatic changes taking place in European societies.

However, there is something nasty going on; research suggests that 75% of Germans do not believe that Islam and the modern world are compatible and, recently quoted in Der Spiegel, 38% feel uncomfortable having Turkish neighbours. I am sure there are similar statistics from other countries.

There is a creation of an Other in Europe today; the Other being a Turk/Arab/Muslim who beats his wife, forces his daughter to wear the headscarf and lives off the welfare state. This image of another culture taking over Europe from within is having an impact on attitudes across Europe. There is of course a question, and a worry, about when this will begin to affect policy.

But to look at the facts; in Germany, the average number of children born to a ‘German’ woman is 1.3 and to a ‘German-Turkish’ woman is 1.7. This is already a big change, showing a convergence of attitudes towards family life and work. In Turkey too, birth rates have fallen dramatically to the extent that in twenty years from now the Turkish population will also stop growing. While the debate suggests further polarization, the real trend is a convergence.

What we are seeing is not different cultures clashing, but European wide processes that affect different parts of Europe at different speeds. This is leading to a convergence that will make many of these problems now so easily exploited by populists of ever shade easier to deal with.

Europe’s soft power

This brings me to the third part of my reflections, the soft power of Europe with respect to its periphery. If Europe is not doomed to an unhappy decline because of growing concerns about unmanageable multiculturalism or an ageing population, is the European model still attractive to its neighbours and indeed to Europeans themselves? It has been suggested that economic pressures and a shrinking population mean that Europe will lose its culture too and no longer be attractive or able to carry out its visionary policies.

Enlargement is a good indicator. There is the theory, a narrative, that the European Union in particular – but also the Council of Europe – was very bold in the days of rapid enlargement in the 1990s, but then lost its appetite. But enlargement didn’t stop in 2005; since then Bulgaria and Romania have joined the European Union, Turkey and Croatia have started Accession talks and more countries are queuing up. In Moldova there is a pro European integration coalition government that has held office and which is at the moment in the process of forming a new government. The idea in Moldova that the European Union has nothing to offer would seem bizarre. Finally, there is the remarkable transformation in Turkey in recent years which has made possible the resolution of some problems that had seemed intractable.

There are important positive trends relating to European soft power. In 2001 Tuncer Kilinc, General Secretary of the Turkish National Security Council, made a speech in Brussels about how the European Union had evil intentions to destroy Turkey through their policies towards the Turkish minorities in Europe, missionaries to Turkey and the EU Accession process. At the time many people in Turkey shared his views.

Moving forward almost a decade, a speech made last year in Sarajevo by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu offers a completely different narrative. During his visit he suggested that “Successful civilisations create a new multicultural coexistence through economic mechanisms and trade: Multicultural existence is very important…the rise of a civilisation can only be understood by analysing its urban structures“. He then pointed to ancient Rome noting that before there was a Roman Empire, the city of Rome was only inhabited by Romans, but once the Roman Empire was established, Rome became a cosmopolitan city. Success, he suggested, leads to the mixing of people, to cosmopolitanism. Cultural diversity is not a threat, but an opportunity.

Turkey’s foreign policy towards its neighbours also offers a view on how to extend soft power in the Middle East, an area of authoritarian regimes. Ahmet Davutoğlu[7] writes that relations with countries that have a different political structure “need to be focused on inter-societal relations, including economic and cultural elements, particularly in our region where authoritarian regimes are the norm. We need to improve transport possibilities, extend cross-border trade, increase cultural exchange programmes, facilitate labour and capital movement and help overcome problems stemming from central elites“.

Thus we can see that over a ten year period there has been a dramatic shift. Turkey does have some way to go, as has all of Europe, but the discourse is converging even while it recognises that balancing pluralist societies and their many different identities is a challenge.

This way of thinking about foreign policy is very much a European one which goes beyond its borders as illustrated by the Turkish proposal for a “Schengen zone” in the Middle East, offering a visa free regime for most of its neighbours. The border revolution is extending soft power whilst at the same time developing new trade links.

Conclusion

One could say that Turkey is doing Europe’s work! Turkey today is becoming a subversive power in its neighbourhood. It is allowing hundreds of thousands of Syrians, Iraqis, Iranians and Azerbaijanis to come to Turkey and see a country which has competitive elections and an economy which is the fastest growing, not only in the region, but in the OECD.

People from neighbouring states witnessing soldiers being tried for plotting against the government is having a profound impact. It is no surprise that now in Egypt, when you ask people what they see as a realistic model for the future, they are saying neither an authoritarian regime nor a theocratic autocracy, but rather something like Turkey.

So what does this mean for the challenges Europe faces in the next ten years? It means that in the last twenty years Europe has managed a miracle through the European model and European norms. It means a shared understanding that there are certain positive ways of engaging in politics, such as functional integration, the use of soft power and the development of a ‘border revolution’.

Every border around Austria has now disappeared. In 1997, when Romano Prodi, the then Italian Prime Minister, travelled to Germany, he had to plead with the Germans to trust the Italians to take care of their borders so that Italy could join the Schengen zone. Now the Schengen zone has been extended all the way to Poland’s eastern border and probably by the end of this year will include Romania and Bulgaria.

These revolutionary policies, which so far have also had the advantage of being popular, are now being extended to the European neighbourhood in unexpected ways. Of course Europe still faces many challenges: the Balkans are stuck; there is a crisis of confidence in countries like Albania and Kosovo; Turkey is frustrated and would like to have clearer signals; the Moldovans are not finding that their efforts are sufficiently appreciated. And on the European periphery we have problems with elections that do not meet all the standards of the Council of Europe.

But overall, I think that the fox will be more successful in predicting the future if it bets on the robustness of the European construction and the values that underpin it. Europe has the tools, the norms based on a sense of what constitutes good behaviour and, come to think of it, European norms have not had a bad period in the last decade. Like the New York subway, we sometimes forget that these norms require constant action to be defended, not to be flooded by indifference. It looks as though the Council of Europe and other organisations, but particularly the Council of Europe, do have an extremely powerful tool by reminding people in Europe and on the periphery that there are advantages to adopting these norms.


[1] This concept was first expressed by the ancient Greek warrior poet Archilochus: “The fox knows many things; the hedgehog one great thing.” and later expanded upon by Isaiah Berlin.

[2] http://www.esiweb.org/

[3] Alan Weisman, The World Without Us, Thomas Dunne Books, USA, 2007

[4] Robert J. Samuelson, The End of Europe, Washington Post, June 15, 2005

[5] http://www.economist.com/node/17722567

[6] See: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/10/16/uk-germany-merkel-immigration-idUKTRE69F19T20101016

[7] Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu, “Strategic Depth”, 2001